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Estimates of bank cost efficiency can be biased if bank heterogeneity is ignored.  I compare X-
inefficiency derived from a model constraining the cost frontier to be the same for all banks in the U.S.
and a model allowing for different frontiers and error terms across Federal Reserve Districts.   I find that
the data reject the single cost function model; X-inefficiency measures based on the single cost function
model are, on average, higher than those based on the separate cost functions model; the distributions of
the one-sided error terms are wider for the single cost function model than for the separate cost functions
model; and the ranking of Districts by the level of X-inefficiency differs in the two models.  The results
suggest it is important when studying X-inefficiency to account for differences across the markets in
which banks are operating and that since X-inefficiency is, by construction, a residual, it will be
particularly sensitive to omissions in the basic model.
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1.  Introduction
U.S. commercial banks have been operating in an increasingly competitive environment.  The
long-term viability of commercial banks in this environment depends in part on how efficiently they are
run.  Thus, there has been an increased interest in studies of U.S. bank efficiency and, in particular, in
studies that focus on X-inefficiency.  X-inefficiency comes in two varieties.  A bank is technically
inefficient if it is using too many inputs to produce its output.  In this case, the bank would not be
operating on its production frontier but would be at some point in the interior.  A bank is said to be
allocatively inefficient if it is using the wrong mix of inputs to produce its output.  In this case, the bank
may be operating on its production frontier, but it is not minimizing its production costs.
Previous studies found X-inefficiency on the order of 20 to 30 percent at U.S. banks.  These
numbers did not seem implausibly high, since banking is a regulated industry in which competitive forces
had been restrained until recently.  Yet Mester (forthcoming) found X-inefficiency in the 6 to 9 percent
range at banks operating in the Third Federal Reserve District.   Taking these estimates at face value
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would suggest that Third District banks are operating more efficiently than banks elsewhere in the nation. 
One possible contributing factor to the difference, however, is that Mester (forthcoming) estimated a cost
model that accounted for the quality and riskiness of a bank’s output.  Unless such differences are
controlled for, some banks might be mislabelled as inefficient because they are operating in a more risk-
averse manner than others, while others might be mislabelled as efficient because they are producing
lower quality output than others.   Thus, the X-inefficiency measures can be expected to differ between
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models that control for output risk and quality and those that do not.  Another possible explanation for
the difference is that fitting a single cost model to the U.S. is not sufficiently flexible to account for
differences across markets in which the banks operate, and this could upwardly bias the inefficiency
measures in previous national studies.  In other words, estimates of bank cost efficiency can be biased if
bank heterogeneity is not accounted for in the cost function.  Other papers that have studied cost function
heterogeneity include Kolari and Zardkoohi (1995), who estimate separate cost functions for banks
grouped by product mix, Akhavein, Swamy, and Taubman (forthcoming), who estimate the banks’ profit2
function using a variable coefficient method, which essentially allows the parameters to vary by bank,
and Mester (1993), who allows mutual and stock S&L cost functions and error structures to differ.
In this paper, I compare differences in X-inefficiency measures derived from a model that
constrains the cost function to be the same for all banks in the nation and a model that allows the cost
functions and error terms to differ across Federal Reserve Districts.  As in Mester (forthcoming), both
models account for the quality and riskiness of bank output, so that differences in the X-inefficiency
measures cannot be attributed to this factor.   In addition to presenting the usual measure of X-
3
inefficiency—the mean of the conditional distribution of the one-sided component of the cost function's
error term—I characterize the spread of the distributions with 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. 
These confidence intervals indicate the degree to which the mean of the conditional distribution is a good
summary statistic for the level of inefficiency.  The wider the distribution, the less able is the mean to
characterize the distribution and so to characterize inefficiency.  I also calculate approximate standard
errors for the estimates of the X-inefficiency measures.  These standard errors reflect the accuracy with
which the parameters of the error structure are measured and allow me to test for equality of the
measures across Federal Reserve Districts.
My results show that both explanations for differences in the findings of Mester (forthcoming)
and for previous national studies contain some truth: Third District banks do seem to be operating more
efficiently than other banks, but I also find that estimating a single cost function across the nation is
insufficiently flexible.  In both the single cost function model and the separate cost functions model,
average inefficiency is lower in the Third District than in the other Federal Reserve Districts.  But my
results also show that (1) the data reject the single cost function model; (2) the X-inefficiency measures
based on the single cost function model are, on average, higher and more precisely estimated than those
based on the separate cost functions model; (3) the distributions of the one-sided error terms on which X-
inefficiency measures are based are wider for the single cost function model than for the separate cost
functions model (so while the typical measure of bank-specific inefficiency is more precisely estimated
in the single cost function model, it is not as good a characterization of bank-specific inefficiency for the3
single cost function model as it is in the separate cost functions model); (4) the ranking of the Districts by
the average level of X-inefficiency differs slightly, but statistically significantly, in the two models; and
(5) the differences in X-inefficiency across Districts reflect more than just differences in bank size, 
District geographic size, and District population.
These results suggest that it is important when doing studies of X-inefficiency to account for
differences across the markets in which the banks are operating.  They also illustrate a more general
lesson: Since X-inefficiency is, by construction, a residual, it will be particularly sensitive to omissions
in the basic model.  Perhaps even more care than is usual should be taken in specifying the cost model on
which the X-inefficiency measures will be based.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the stochastic econometric
frontier models to be estimated.  The inefficiency measures, including the confidence intervals for the
bank-specific measures, are derived.  Section 3 discusses the functional form of the cost function, data,
and variables.  Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2.  The models
I use the stochastic econometric cost frontier methodology to derive measures of X-inefficiency.  
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A bank is labeled as inefficient if its costs are higher than the costs predicted for an efficient bank
producing the same output/input-price combination and the difference cannot be explained by statistical
noise.  The cost frontier is obtained by estimating a cost function with a composite error term,  , which is i
the sum of a two-sided error, v (which represents random fluctuations in cost) and a one-sided positive i
error, u (which represents X-inefficiency).  Measures of X-inefficiency are derived from this one-sided i
component of the error term.
For N firms in the sample,
ln C = ln C(y,w,q,k;B) + u + v,     i=1,...,N, (1) ii i i i ii
where C is observed cost of bank i, y is the vector of output levels for bank i, w is the vector of input i ii
prices for bank i, q is a variable characterizing the quality of bank i’s output, k is the level of financial i i
capital at bank i, B is a vector of parameters, ln C(y,w,q,k;B) is the predicted log cost function of a ii iiln L ' N
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cost-minimizing bank operating at (y,w,q,k), v is a two-sided error term representing the statistical ii ii i
noise, and u is a one-sided error term representing inefficiency.  The v are assumed to be independently i i
and identically distributed, and the u are assumed to be distributed independently of the v.  i i
Note that as in Mester (forthcoming) and Hughes and Mester (1993), output quality, q, and the i
level of financial capital, k, are included in the cost model, since both can affect measures of X- i
inefficiency.  For example, if a bank has a large proportion of nonperforming loans, it might mean the
bank scrimped on the initial credit evaluation and loan monitoring.  This could show up as a short-run
cost savings, and the bank might be labeled as more efficient than a bank that spent resources to ensure
its loans were of higher quality.   Financial capital is included to account for the probability of default,
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which again can affect measures of inefficiency, and also because financial capital is an input into the
production process; it can be used to fund loans as a substitute for deposits or other borrowed money. 
The level of financial capital, rather than its price, is included because banks may not be using the cost-
minimizing level of financial capital (banks might be risk-averse and there are regulatory minimum
capital requirements—see Mester (forthcoming) and Hughes and Mester (1993) for further discussion).
Here, as is typical of most inefficiency studies, it is assumed that the v are normally distributed i
with mean 0 and variance   and the u are half-normally distributed, i.e., the u are the absolute values of
2
vi i
a variable that is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance  .  With these distributional
2
u
assumptions, the log-likelihood function of the model is
(2)
where N is the number of firms,   = u + v,   =   +  ,  , and  (@) is the standard normal iii uv
222
cumulative distribution function.  The model can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques.
Inefficiency measures are calculated using the residuals after the model is estimated.   For the
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half-normal case, an estimate of the mean inefficiency is given by E(u)/ , where ˆ  is the estimate ˆ
iu
of  .  Since the distribution of the maximum likelihood estimates is known, one can calculate an u








































A bank-level measure of inefficiency is usually given by the mean of the conditional distribution
of u given  .  For the normal–half-normal stochastic model, the conditional distribution of u given   is a ii ii
normal distribution, N(µ , ) truncated at zero, where µ  /   and   /  .    The density function is  ** * *
22 7
.( 3 )
 The mean of this conditional distribution is
 
(4)
E(u* ) is an unbiased but inconsistent estimator of u, since regardless of the number of observations, N, ii i
the variance of the estimator remains nonzero [see Greene (1991), p. 18].  To get estimates, E(u* ), of ˆ
ii
these measures, we evaluate (4) at the estimates of   and  .  One can calculate an approximate standard uv
error for these estimates by linearizing (4): the approximate standard error of is
These approximate standard errors allow us to test whether the
average of the estimates of E(u* ) in any two Districts are statistically different.   These standard errors ˆ
ii
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give an indication of how precisely estimated E(u* ) is, which, of course, depends on how precisely the ˆ
ii
parameters of the underlying distributions of u and v are estimated. ii
But mean is only one aspect of the conditional distribution of u given  .  How well the mean of ii
the distribution characterizes the distribution and serves as a summary statistic for bank-specific
inefficiency will depend on how widely spread the distribution is.  The spread of the distribution can be
characterized by confidence intervals for (u* ).  It is important to remember, however, that these bands ii
9
do not account for the fact that the parameters of the conditional distribution are estimated;  they
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describe the conditional distribution, but do not indicate how precisely E(u* ) is estimated.  As we will ii
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estimated, but because heterogeneity is likely to increase with sample size, E(u* ) will become a poorer ˆ
ii
summary statistic for bank-specific inefficiency.
As shown in Mester (forthcoming), the 90 percent “confidence interval” for (u* ) is [(u* ), ii ii 0 . 0 5
(u* ) ] and the 95 percent “confidence interval” for (u* ) is [(u* ),  ( u * ) ], where i i 0.95 i i i i 0.025 i i 0.975
.( 5 )
Below, I compare X-inefficiency measures for the National Model and the District Model.  The
National Model restricts the cost frontier and the distribution of the error terms to be the same for all
banks in the nation.  That is, equation (1) is estimated including all the banks in the sample.  This is
comparable to models estimated in previous studies of X-inefficiency at U.S. banks.  
However, the National Model might be too restrictive.  If economic conditions differ across the
nation, a single cost frontier might not be able to capture these differences.  X-inefficiency measures
based on such a model might be contaminated, since they are derived from the residuals in the estimation. 
That is, the better the specification of the cost frontier model, the better the measures of X-inefficiency
can be expected to be.  The District Model allows the cost frontier and error distribution to differ across
Federal Reserve Districts.   This is equivalent to estimating equation (1) separately for each District.  Of
11
course, one drawback of the District Model compared to the National Model is that there are fewer
observations per District than for the nation as a whole.  But since the National Model is a restricted
version of the District Model, a likelihood ratio test can be used to test the National Model vs. the
District Model.
3.  Functional form, data, and variables
I specify the translog functional form for the cost frontier ln C(y,w,q,k;B): ii iisij ' sji and gij ' gji
j
j
bj ' 1, j
j
gij ' 0, éi, j
j
d ij ' 0, éi,
j
j
tkj ' 0, and j
j
tqj ' 0 by linear homogeneity.
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(6)
where:     by symmetry,
I used 1991-92 data from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income that commercial
banks must file each quarter.   There were 6630 banks in the sample.  I excluded nonbank banks, banks
12
in unit banking or restricted branch banking states, the special purpose banks in Delaware (legislated
under the Financial Center Development Act and the Consumer Credit Bank Act), de novo banks (i.e.,
banks less than five years old as of December 1992, which have start-up costs that more mature banks do
not have), banks that were involved in a merger in 1991-92, banks that bought branches from failed banks
in 1991-92, banks that changed charter type in 1991-92, banks that changed holding company status in
1991-92, banks that changed Federal Reserve System membership in 1991-92, and banks with assets over
$4 billion in 1992, since larger banks very likely use a different production technology than smaller
banks.  The $4 billion cutoff was chosen so that the Third District banks included in this sample were the
same banks included in the sample used in Mester (forthcoming).  The median asset size of banks
included was $59 million, and the average asset size was $144 million.
The outputs and inputs used here are the same as those in Mester (forthcoming) and are based on
the intermediation (also known as the asset) approach to the banking firm, which views the bank as using
labor, physical capital, and funding to produce earning assets [see Sealey and Lindley (1977)].  The three
outputs included were y  = real estate loans, y  = commercial and industrial loans, lease financing 12
receivables, agricultural loans, loans to depository institutions, acceptances of other banks, loans to
foreign governments, obligations of states and political subdivisions, and other loans, and y  = loans to 3
individuals.  Each was measured by the average of the dollar volumes reported in December 1992 and8
December 1991.  These three outputs account for nearly all of a bank’s non-securities earning assets.  The
average volume of each of these three outputs at banks in the sample was about $43 million, $23 million,
and $14 million, respectively.  Thus, about 54 percent of the average bank’s loan portfolio is in real
estate, about 29 percent is business loans, and the rest is loans to individuals.
The inputs whose prices were used to estimate the cost frontier included labor, physical capital,
and borrowed money (including deposits, federal funds, and other borrowed money) used to fund the
outputs.  The wage rate w  was proxied by [salaries and benefits expenses in 1992/number of full-time 1
equivalent employees at year-end 1992].  The unit price of physical capital, w , was constructed as the 2
[premises and fixed assets (net of rental income) expenses in 1992/average value of premises and fixed
assets in 1992].  The borrowed money price, w , was constructed as [(interest expense on deposits, net of 3
service charges + interest expense of fed funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to
repurchase + interest on demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury and on other borrowed money +
interest on subordinated notes and debentures in 1992)/average dollar volume of these types of funds in
1992].  Total costs, C, were labor, premises, and fixed assets expense, and (interest expense on deposits,
net of service charges + interest expense of fed funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to
repurchase + interest on demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury and on other borrowed money +
interest on subordinated notes and debentures in 1992)×(real estate loans, commercial and industrial
loans, lease financing receivables, agricultural loans, loans to depository institutions, acceptances of
other banks, loans to foreign governments, obligations of states and political subdivisions, other loans,
and loans to individuals/total earning assets).
13
  Loan output quality, q, was proxied by the average volume of nonperforming loans in 1992. 
Nonperforming loans are loans that are 30 or more days past due but still accruing interest plus loans that
are not accruing interest.  The volume of a bank's nonperforming loans relative to the level of bank
output is inversely related to the bank's loan quality.  Note that while the national macroeconomy can
affect nonperforming loans, its effect is felt equally across banks.  The differences in nonperforming
loans across banks capture not only differences in quality across banks, but also differences in local9
economic conditions to the extent that banks operate in local loan markets.  Finally, financial capital, k,
was measured as the average volume of equity capital in 1992.  A summary of the data and the maximum
likelihood parameter estimates of the models are available from the author.
4.  Empirical results
Table 1 reports estimates of the inefficiency measures discussed in Section 2 for the National
Model, along with approximate standard errors, and the minimum and maximum values of E(u* ) for the ˆ
ii
entire sample and by District.  The National Model shows average X-inefficiency at U.S. banks to be
around 16 percent.  That is, given its particular output level and mix, on average, if a bank were to use its
inputs as efficiently as possible, it could reduce its production cost by roughly 16 percent.   The table
14
also shows that the average level of inefficiency, as measured by average E(u* ), varies over the ˆ
ii
Districts, from 13.5 percent in the Third District to 18.8 percent in the Eleventh District.  These measures
are statistically significantly different from zero, and all are statistically significantly different from one
another at the 10 percent or better level, except that the First and Fifth, Third and Eighth, and Sixth and
Twelfth Districts’ estimates do not statistically differ from one another, respectively.  As shown in the
table, the results are similar for E(u* ) evaluated at the average levels of cost, outputs, and input prices in ˆ
ii
each District.  This can be thought of as the inefficiency of the “average bank” in the District.  Thus,
there is significant variation in inefficiency across most Districts.  That the average level of inefficiency
is somewhat lower than that found in previous national studies might be due to the fact that here I control
for output risk and quality or because I am using more recent data.  
Of course, the averages obscure some of the variation in inefficiency across the sample, and there
is actually quite a lot of variation: from 2.2 percent to 89.2 percent.  In the National Model, the most
efficient bank is located in the Third District; its estimated inefficiency measure, E(u * ), is 0.0224, with ˆ
ii
approximate standard error 3.56×10 .  The 90 percent “confidence interval” is [0.00123, 0.0685]; the 95
!4
percent “confidence interval” is [0.000609, 0.0835].  The least efficient bank is located in the Tenth
District; its estimated inefficiency measure, E(u* ), is 0.892, with approximate standard error 1.42×10 .  ˆ
ii
! 2
The 90 percent “confidence interval” is [0.691, 1.09]; the 95 percent “confidence interval” is [0.653,10
1.13].
Table 2 reports similar information for the District Model.  Note here, though, that the estimates
are based on cost frontiers and error structures that are allowed to differ across Districts.  The first thing
to note is that for three of the Districts—2, 5, and 12—the degree of skewness of the ordinary least
squares residual of the cost function estimation was negative.  As shown by Waldman (1982) this means
that the maximum likelihood estimates of the model are the ordinary least squares estimates; in other
words, the one-sided component of the error term is zero.  More generally, this suggests that the frontier
model with normal–half-normal error term does not fit the data in these Districts.  Also note that
convergence was not achieved in District 1; the difficulty might be a lack of observations.
One striking thing to note is that based on the District Model, two of the Districts—3 and
4—have average inefficiency levels, measured by average E(u* ) or by E(u), under 10 percent, while two ˆ
ii i ˆ
other Districts—8 and 9—have average inefficiency levels below 14 percent.  These estimates are quite a
bit lower than ones found in the National Model or in previous studies.  The average inefficiency, by
either measure, for each District is statistically significantly different from zero, and the measures are
statistically significantly different from one another, at the 10 percent or better level, for the following
pairs of Districts: 3&6, 3&10, 3&11, 4&6, 4&7, 4&10, 4&11, 6&8, 8&10, and 8&11.  Similar results are
obtained for E(u* ) at the “average bank” in each District, with stronger statistical differences across ˆ
ii
Districts. 
As was true for the National Model, the average levels of inefficiency across Districts in the
District Model also obscure substantial variation in inefficiency across banks in the sample.  In the
District Model, the most efficient bank is located in the Seventh District; its estimated inefficiency
measure, E(u* ), is 0.0263, with approximate standard error 1.26×10 .  The 90 percent “confidence ˆ
ii
! 3
interval” is [0.00148, 0.0751]; the 95 percent “confidence interval” is [0.000731, 0.0901].  The least
efficient bank is located in the Tenth District; its estimated inefficiency measure, E(u* ), is 0.926, with ˆ
ii
approximate standard error 2.89×10 .  The 90 percent “confidence interval” is [0.740, 1.11]; the 95
!2
percent “confidence interval” is [0.704, 1.15].11
Table 3 presents some measures that can be used in comparing the National and District Models. 
As indicated in the top panel, the average level of inefficiency over the eight Districts for which
estimates were obtained in the District Model is about 2 percentage points lower when measured by E(u), ˆ
i
and 1 percentage point lower when measured by average E(u* ), for the District Model than for the ˆ
ii
National Model, i.e., 14 or 15 percent compared to 16 percent.  A t-test indicates that this differnce is
statistically different for E(u); t-tests also indicate that the Fourth District’s average E(u * ) estimated ˆ
i ii ˆ
from the National Model differs significantly from that estimated from the District Model.
Another thing to note is that there is a tradeoff between the precision of the estimates E(u* ) and ˆ
ii
the ability of E(u* ) to serve as a summary statistic for bank-specific inefficiency.  Since the sample size ˆ
ii
is larger when estimating the National Model, the parameters of the error structure are more precisely
estimated, and this, in turn, means that the bank-specific measures of inefficiency, E(u* ), are more ˆ
ii
precisely measured than they are in the District Model.  However, the spreads of the conditional
distributions (u* ) (as indicated by the widths of the 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals) are ii
generally wider for the National Model than for the District Model.   These spreads are wider because
15
the banks in the National sample are more heterogeneous than the banks in each District.  Thus, while the
E(u * )’s are more precisely estimated for the National Model, they are poorer summary statistics for ˆ
ii
bank-specific inefficiency in the National Model than in the District Model.
The middle panel lists the Districts ranked by average inefficiency (i.e., by average E(u* ) and ˆ
ii
by E(u* ) at the “average bank” in the District), from most efficient to least efficient.  The arrows under ˆ
ii
the Districts indicate where the null hypothesis of the Districts having the same level of inefficiency
cannot be rejected: the District at the base of an arrow (|) has an insignificantly different level of
inefficiency from every District covered by the arrow.  For example, in the National Model, the null
hypothesis of equal E(u* )’s is rejected for all pairs of Districts except for Districts 3 and 8.   For the ˆ
ii
District Model, the null hypothesis of equal average E(u* )’s cannot be rejected for Districts 3 and 4, 3 ˆ
ii
and 8, 3 and 9, and 3 and 7, but can be rejected for 4 and 7.  
Note that the rankings for the National and District Models are quite similar at the top and12
bottom—for example, both models indicate that average inefficiency is lowest in the Third District and
highest in the Eleventh District.  It is in the middle range where there is a discrepancy.  In particular, in
the National Model, District 7 ranks significantly more efficient than District 4, but in the District Model,
District 4 ranks significantly more efficient than District 7.
The bottom panel gives the correlation coefficient between the National and District Models for
the point estimates, E(u* ), and for the width of the “confidence intervals” for all banks in the eight ˆ
ii
Districts.  In all cases, the correlation is quite high, but is below 90 percent, suggesting that modeling
assumptions do matter in efficiency studies. 
The final, and most important test, is a likelihood ratio test of the National Model against the
District Model.  The value of the likelihood ratio test statistic (when both Models were estimated
excluding District 1 banks, since convergence was not achieved in District 1 in the District Model) is
1836.15; the number of restrictions is 380.  Thus, the National Model is strongly statistically rejected by
the data.
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Perhaps a better way to see the differences is by comparing Figures 1 and 2, which give the
frequency distributions of the bank-specific inefficiency measures, E(u* ), for the National and District ˆ
ii
Models, respectively.  As can be seen, the left-hand tail (low inefficiency measures) is quite a bit thicker
for the District Model.
It remains to determine what accounts for the differences in inefficiency across Districts.  While
a thorough investigation is beyond the scope of this paper, we can determine whether the differences are
accounted for merely by differences in the sizes of banks across Districts, the geographic size of the
District, and/or the  population of the District.  To investigate this question, I employed a two-step
procedure for both the National and District Models.  In step 1, I regressed the bank-specific inefficiency
measures, E(u* ), from the model on a constant term, bank size (measured as the average asset size of the ˆ
ii
bank in December 1991 and December 1992), the land area of the District in which the bank is located,
and the population of the District.  E(u* ) is between 0 and 1 for each bank, so I specified a logistic ˆ
ii
relationship between the explanatory variables and  E(u* ).   Thus, I estimated ˆ
ii










In step 2, I regressed the estimated residual from the step 1 estimation,  , on a constant term and a set of ˆ
i
dummy variables, D ,....,D  for the National Model and D ,D ,D ,D ,D ,D ,D  for the District Model, 1 1 2 3467891 0
where Di = 1 if the bank is in District i, and 0 otherwise.  I used a likelihood ratio test to test whether the
coefficients on the dummy variables equal the coefficient on the constant.   If so, one could conclude
18
that the differences in the bank-specific inefficiency measures were explained by bank size, District size,
and District population and that any residual differences were unrelated to the District in which the bank
was located.  However, for both the National and District Models, this null hypothesis can be rejected at
the 0.001 level of significance.  That is, there are differences in inefficiency across Districts not
accounted for by differences in bank size, District size, and District population.  (The value of the
likelihood ratio test statistic was 325.02 for the National Model, with 11 degrees of freedom, and 80.85
for the District Model, with 7 degrees of freedom. )  In both Models, in step 1, bank size was
19
insignificantly positively related to inefficiency, while District size and District population were
significantly positively related to inefficiency.
5.  Conclusions
One could argue that the differences found between the National and District Models are not that
large.  However, a one-to-two-percentage-point difference in the average level of inefficiency seems
significant enough, and the differences between the E(u) for the nation based on the National Model (i.e., ˆ
i
16 percent), and the E(u)’s for, say, the Third and Fourth Districts based on the District Model (i.e., 7.9 ˆ
i
percent and 9.3 percent, respectively) seem quite large.  These differences might be large enough to lead
one to different conclusions about the health of the banking industry or the potential for inducing further
cost efficiency via mergers, for example.
The differences found here also suggest that Mester (forthcoming) found a significantly lower
level of inefficiency in her study of Third District banks compared to previous national studies both
because Third District banks seem to be operating more efficiently, on average, than banks elsewhere in14
the nation, and because she focused on a more homogeneous market, while the national studies estimated
a single cost frontier across heterogeneous markets.
The general lesson here is that it would appear to make sense to test whether one’s model fits
well across heterogeneous markets.  This is likely to be especially important in inefficiency studies using
the stochastic econometric frontier methodology, because the inefficiency measures are, by design,
residuals.  It is also important to remember that there is often a tradeoff between the precision of the
estimates of bank-specific inefficiency, E(u* ), and the value of E(u* ), as an indicator of bank-specific ˆ
ii ii
inefficiency.  While increasing the sample size will likely increase the precision of E(u* ), it may also ˆ
ii
make E(u* ) a poorer summary statistic for bank-specific inefficiency, since bank heterogeneity is likely ii
to increase with sample size.15
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Table 1.  National Model: X-Inefficiency Measures
E(u ) (2/ ) Average E(u* ) at Min E(u* ) Max E(u* ) ˆ
iu
½
(Approx. E(u* ) “average (Approx. (Approx.















0.161 0.160 0.119 0.0224 0.892
a
























District 2: New York
(173 banks)












































































District 8: St. Louis
(628 banks)
























District 10: Kansas City
(1353 banks)
























District 12: San Francisco
(508 banks)











Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test.
a
Each District’s average E(u* ) is statistically different from another’s at the 10 percent or better level, two-tailed test,
b ˆ
ii
except for the following pairs: 1&5, 3&8, and 6&12.  
Each District’s E(u* ) for the “average bank” is statistically different from another’s at the 10 percent or better level,
c ˆ
ii
two-tailed test, except for the following pairs: 1&4, 2&12, 3&9, 5&8, 5&10, and 8&10.18
Table 2.  District Model: X-Inefficiency Measures
E(u ) = (2/ ) Average E(u* ) at Min E(u* ) Max E(u* ) ˆ
iu
½
(Approx. Std. E(u* ) “average (Approx. Std. (Approx.






















0.0790 0.0789 0.0532 0.0294 0.230
b












0.0926 0.0923 0.0666 0.0266 0.299
a















0.171 0.170 0.118 0.0362 0.773
a












0.151 0.150 0.0904 0.0263 0.773
a










District 8: St. Louis
(628 banks)
0.124 0.124 0.109 0.0293 0.524
a












0.137 0.135 0.0948 0.0279 0.643
a










District 10: Kansas City
(1353 banks)
0.164 0.163 0.125 0.0318 0.926
a












0.174 0.174 0.148 0.0417 0.668
a










District 12: San Francisco
(508 banks)
Skewness < 0
Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test.
a
Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level, two-tailed test.  
b
The average E(u* )’s in the following pairs of Districts are statistically different from one another at the 10 percent or
c ˆ
ii
better level, two-tailed test: 3&6, 3&10, 3&11, 4&6, 4&7, 4&10, 4&11, 6&8, 8&10, and 8&11.  
Each District’s E(u* ) for the “average bank” is statistically different from another’s at the 10 percent or better level,
d ˆ
ii
two-tailed test, except for the following pairs: 3&4, 6&8, 6&9, 6&10, 7&8, 7&9, 8&9, 8&10, and 10&11.19
Table 3.  National Model vs. District Model: For Districts 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
E(u) = Average Min E(u * )M a x   E(u * ) Average Average ˆ
i
(2/ ) E(u * ) width of  width of
½
u
(Approx. (Approx. 90 percent 95 percent










National Model 0.163 0.159 0.0224 0.892 0.293 0.340
a,b








District Model 0.137 0.149 0.0263 0.926 0.258 0.300
a,b








Ranking of the Eight Districts by Average E(u* ) in the National and District Models ˆ
ii
c
Average E(u* )E ( u * ) at “average bank” ˆ
ii ˆ
ii
  most                         least  most                          least
efficient6666666666efficient efficient666666666efficient
National Model National Model  3   8   7   4    9   10   6   11  9   3    7    4    8   10   6  11
b bbb
District Model District Model 3   4    8   9   7   10   6   11  3    4   7    9    8   6   10  11
b bb b
 
Correlations Between Measurements Based on National and District Models
Variable Correlation
E(u * ) ˆ
ii 0.893
a








Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test.
a
This District’s measure in the National Model is significantly different from that in the District model, at the 5 percent
b
level, two-tailed test.
Arrows under Districts indicate which Districts’ inefficiency measures differ significantly as follows: the District at the
c
base of an arrow (|) has an insignificantly (at the 10 percent or better level, two-tailed test) different level of inefficiency
from every other District covered by the arrow.National Model Inefficiency Distribution












































Figure 121District Model Inefficiency Distribution













































      1.  The United States is divided into 12 Federal Reserve Districts, with a Reserve Bank located in
each District.  These Reserve Banks implement many functions of the Federal Reserve System, including
coin and currency distribution, commercial bank examinations, and fiscal-agency functions for the U.S.
Treasury.  (See Board of Governors, 1994).
      2.  See Hughes and Mester (1993) for further discussion.
      3.  Berger and DeYoung (1995) discuss the implications of using nonperforming loans to measure
loan quality, as is done here and in other papers, including Mester (forthcoming), Hughes and Mester
(1993), and two papers written subsequently to this one [Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon (1995,
forthcoming)].
      4.  Other common methodologies are data envelopment analysis, "thick frontier" analysis, and the
“distribution-free” approach.  Mester (forthcoming) and Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) discuss the
pros and cons of these approaches.
      5.  See Berger and DeYoung (1995) for further discussion about controlling for nonperforming loans
when measuring inefficiency.  In particular, a portion of loan quality is endogenous; they propose a
statistical test for determining whether nonperforming loans should be included in the cost function.
      6.  This discussion of the inefficiency measures and confidence intervals follows Mester
(forthcoming).
      7.  This can be seen by adapting for the cost function the equation for the production function derived
in Jondrow et al. (1982).
      8.  Note that in comparing the average inefficiency for two Districts based on the National Model,
described below, the covariances between these average measures must also be taken into account; since
the District Model, described below, estimates separate cost functions and error terms for the District,
these covariances are zero.
      9.  To my knowledge, only Jondrow et al. (1982) and Mester (forthcoming) report confidence bands. 
      10.  Henceforth, I will use quotation marks around the term confidence interval as a reminder of this
Notes24
fact.
      11.  Smaller or other geographic or nongeographic delineations than Federal Reserve Districts might
better define markets, but there would have been too few banks to estimate the models if a finer
delineation had been used.  We show below, however, that the differences in inefficiency across Districts
reflect more than just differences in the geographic size of the Districts.
      12.  Since branching restrictions in some states had only relatively recently been eased (e.g., in
Pennsylvania, branching throughout the state became totally unrestricted only on March 4, 1990), more
years of data were not included in the study.
      13.  As in Hunter, Timme, and Yang (1990), Mester (1992), and Hughes and Mester (1993), and
Mester (forthcoming), the interest expense was weighted by total output/total earning assets to reflect the
interest expense that can be allocated to the bank’s loan output.
      14.  To put this number into perspective, consider that the average annual cost of output production at
banks in the sample was about $5-1/4 million, so a 16 percent reduction in cost could potentially add
about $840,000 to bank profits.  Since the average bank’s size in the sample was around $144 million in
assets, this constitutes a potential increase of 0.6 percent in before-tax return on assets, or nearly 0.4
percent in after-tax ROA, a significant increase.  
      15.  In only two Districts, 6 and 11, is the average width of the “confidence intervals” based on the
District Model larger (and only slightly so) than the average width of the “confidence intervals” based on
the National Model.  This might suggest that the Sixth and Eleventh Districts have substantial within-
District heterogeneity.
      16.  Dropping Districts 1, 2, 5, and 12, the value of the likelihood ratio test statistic is 1441.9577, and
the number of restrictions if 266.  The data also reject the more flexible model obtained by allowing the
constant terms to differ across Districts in the National model, but constraining the rest of the cost
function and error term parameters to be the same across Districts.
      17.  The results are qualitatively similar if instead I specify a linear relationship in step 1.
      18.  The results of these estimations are available from the author.25
      19.  When a linear relationship instead of a logistic relationship is estimated in step 1, the null
hypothesis is still strongly rejected: the values of the likelihood ratio test statistics are 320.56 for the
National Model and 70.02 for the District Model.26
Means of the Variables
Variable Mean Value at U.S.
Banks
(6630 banks)
Total assets 143,990     
(thousands $)
y   Real estate loans 1
(thousands $)
42,513     
y    Commercial and industrial and other loans 2
(thousands $)
22,932     
y Loans to individuals 3
(thousands $)
14,435     
w    Price of labor 1
(thousands $ per employee)
30.4     
w Price of physical capital 2
(thousands $ per thousand $)
0.42     
w Price of deposits and other borrowed money 3
(thousands $ per thousand $)
0.038     
k Financial capital
(thousands $)
11,095     
q Nonperforming loans
(thousands $)
3,525     
C Total cost
(thousands $)
5,288     27
National Model: Five Most Efficient and Five Least Efficient Banks
Location E(u* ) 90 percent 95 percent




Five Most Efficient Banks 3 0.0224 [0.00123, 0.0685] [0.000609, 0.0835]
3 0.0304 [0.00165, 0.0886] [0.000816, 0.107] 
12 0.0312 [0.00170, 0.0908] [0.000840, 0.110] 
1 0.0312 [0.00170, 0.0910] [0.000842, 0.110] 
















Five Least Efficient Banks 10 0.892 [0.691, 1.09] [0.653, 1.13] 
2 0.815 [0.614, 1.02]  [0.575, 1.05] 
11 0.811 [0.610, 1.01]  [0.571, 1.05] 
6 0.717 [0.516, 0.917] [0.477, 0.956]
10 0.691 [0.491, 0.892] [0.452, 0.931]
*














Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test.
*28
District Model: Five Most Efficient and Five Least Efficient Banks
Location E(u* ) 90 percent 95 percent




Five Most Efficient Banks 7 0.0263 [0.00148, 0.0751] [0.000731, 0.0901] 
4 0.0266 [0.00149, 0.0759] [0.000737, 0.0911] 
7 0.0269 [0.00152, 0.0766] [0.000749, 0.0918]
9 0.0279 [0.00157, 0.0796] [0.000776, 0.0954]
















Five Least Efficient Banks 10 0.926 [0.740, 1.11]  [0.704, 1.15]
6 0.773 [0.570, 0.977] [0.531, 1.02] 
7 0.773 [0.639, 0.906] [0.614, 0.931]
10 0.767 [0.580, 0.953] [0.545, 0.988]
7 0.761 [0.627, 0.894] [0.602, 0.920]
*














Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test.
*